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1. Introduction 
Silicon Valley, the Boston Area, the Biovalley, Oxford and Cambridge are known as 
locations with concentrations of high tech industries. The history of a specific geographic 
area may explain the initial location. However, similar cluster elements (leading scientists, 
presence of firms, entrepreneurial culture, etc.) may involve different definitions of 
geography, and their genesis may be via contrasting trajectories. In this paper, we focus on 
the strategic action of visionary institutional entrepreneurs and how they go about building 
effective clusters in the new international business of nanotechnology.  
As defined by Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence (2004), “institutional entrepreneurship 
represents the activities of the actors who have an interest in particular institutional 
arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform 
existing ones”. Cluster-institutionalising entrepreneurs are those who promote the creation 
and the institutionalisation of clusters. Rip (2002) emphasises the main dynamics of the 
constitution of geographic agglomeration: national and regional top-down policies enacted 
to encourage the emergence of specific clusters on the one side, and local bottom-up 
dynamics based on localised knowledge spillovers on the other. The key finding of this 
paper is that cluster-institutionalising entrepreneurs combine multiple-level processes 
(organisation, cluster, regional, national and supranational) to promote the cluster. In 
order to institutionalise the cluster, their activities may deinstitutionalise, even partially 
wipe out, existing organisations. Whereas institutional studies have been performed in 
relatively mature fields (for example Lounsbury, 2002) and in emerging fields (Lawrence, 
Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; Maguire et al., 2004), what we look at here is a mixed process. 
The emergence of nanotechnologies results from the convergence of the previous wave of 
new industries - microelectronics, biotechnology, informatics and instrumentation - 
opening up technological options and industry structures, creating opportunities that 
institutional entrepreneurs can grasp.  
The analysis of emerging nano-districts (clusters in nanotechnology) in Grenoble and 
Twente (together with other Dutch centres) sheds light on the critical role of institutional 
entrepreneurs who bring together local, national and European policy makers, firms and 
research organisations (such as national labs and universities). Entrepreneurs may initiate 
a convergence amongst loosely coupled organisations (Bonaccorsi, 2002). Co-location in a 
cluster produces close ties, enabling informal meetings and bridging different networks 
(financial, scientific, academic and industry), and tending to stimulate a convergence of 
anticipations. However, actual physical co-location may not be an essential precondition, or 
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necessarily an outcome. Institutional entrepreneurs are those who create the necessary 
linkages and build momentum. Institution building co-evolves with the overall development 
of the scientific and technological fields, and path creation may occur (Garud & Karnoe, 
2003).  
This paper addresses the role of entrepreneurs who orchestrate the transformation of the 
social/institutional and technical organization, against a backdrop of emerging interactions 
and stabilising patterns. To understand the dynamics of cluster-institutionalising 
entrepreneurs, we use the theoretical framework proposed by Czarniawska & Joerges 
(1996) who identify three phases: (1) Articulation of goal and formation and selection of 
ideas, concluded by shift to determined action. (2) Mobilization of resources and of 
credibility, concluded by a first appropriation and decision to go ahead. (3) 
realization/materialization, including the concrete negotiations and implementations; and 
our analysis identifies these stages in its consideration of two contrasting case studies. Data 
collection is based on historical records, archives and interviews with the main actors, 
including in-depth discussions with the main entrepreneur figures. The analysis and 
presentation of the cases is sequential, in the sense that Minatec (Grenoble) is discussed in 
detail to show the translations made by the institutional entrepreneur working at different 
levels, while the Twente/Netherlands case allows us to consider further complexities, in 
particular how the entrepreneurs, because of the multi-level dynamics of their situation, 
had to accept shifts in their plans to achieve at least part of their goals. 
The paper contributes first to the theoretical understanding of how the institutional 
entrepreneur defines tactics and activities to support their vision. It specifically highlights 
the process of enrolment around a vision. It shows how and when the critical questions are 
addressed so as to avoid weakening the emerging institution. One intriguing feature of the 
entrepreneurs’ activities, as we will show in the case studies, is how their strategy includes, 
and sometimes gives precedence, to building an “exterior” of promising proposals and their 
acceptance, in order to be able to create a working “interior”.2 Second, it explores how the 
institutional entrepreneur handles a de-institutionalisation process within their own 
organisation for the benefit of the cluster. Third, our study illustrates the multilevel action 
of institutional entrepreneurs who build on their own legitimacy to access to resources at 
                                                 
2 This is a general feature of the activities of so-called moral entrepreneurs (Howard S. Becker, 
Outsiders. Studies in the Sociology of Deviance, New York: Free Press, 1963; Richard Rettig, Cancer 
Crusade, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). 
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the local level, making sense of loosely coupled scientific actions to gain legitimacy for the 
physical development of cluster resources.  
2. THEORETICAL ARTICULATIONS 
In different geographic areas (Europe, North America, Asia, India, etc.), a number of 
locations are competing to become leading nanotechnology clusters, concentrating both 
public and private investments, as it happened with biotechnologies (Cooke, 2002; Powell, 
Koput, Bowie, & Smith-Doerr, 2002; Prevezer, 1997)3. The emergence of a specific area 
results from several factors, such as historical development and investments paths 
(Saxenian, 1990), presence of large firms (Agrawal & Cockbrun, 2003) or of star scientists 
(Zucker, Darby, & Brewer, 1998). However, the presence of such elements (leading 
scientists, presence of firms, entrepreneurial culture, etc.) will not be enough to guarantee 
a self-reinforcing – and ultimately successful - trajectory unless they are marshalled by an 
organising vision. We argue that the take-off of one amongst all the potential regional 
clusters results from the action of cluster-institutionalising entrepreneurs, who manage to 
play on actors’ anticipations to bring local, national and international actors together.  
Aldrich and Fiol (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994) examine the social processes surrounding the 
emergence of new industries, from the first pioneering ventures through the early stages of 
growth to the point where the structure stabilizes as the industry becomes established. 
Borrowing from institutional theory, we study the process of building two geographically 
localised nanotechnology networks. Aldrich and Fiol extend the theories linking legitimacy 
and industry creation. They analyse entrepreneurs as promoters of new meanings that 
eventually alter existing institutional norms. In that perspective, social contexts represent 
not only patterns of stabilised meaning but also sites within which meanings are 
renegotiated. Thus entrepreneurs, including private founding firms, are not only setting up 
new firms and organisations, but through their renegotiation processes, also promoting 
new institutions. 
Institutional theory has been expanded to explain how institutions change in character and 
potency over time. As DiMaggio (1988) points out, “institutional theory tells us little about 
‘institutionalization’ as an unfinished process”. It also tells little about the characteristics 
                                                 
3 Powell et al. show that more than 50% of American biotech firms are clustered in only four locations. 
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of the institutions involved in the institutionalization process. The idea of institutional 
entrepreneurship is one entry point to explain the institutionalisation process, i.e. the 
process by which agents deploy resources at their disposal to create, shape and empower 
institutions. In such situations, the entrepreneur works in a heterogeneous situation, to 
mobilise resources from different angles and aggregate them into a persuasive and 
powerful whole. Such a framework of analysis may well apply to the building of districts on 
convergent technologies, where some of the elements - organizations, firms, universities 
and facilities - already exist.  
Institutional-entrepreneur theorists identify three main characteristics in the 
institutionalization process. First, institutionalization is a socio-political process in which 
actors deploy enrolment strategies to improve their position in the struggle to capture and 
control resources. These battles mostly take place in a specific organisational field, at an 
intermediate level between organizations and society. Institutional entrepreneurs have a 
central responsibility in the creation, transformation and diffusion of institutions, based on 
the alignment of actors’ interest (Callon, 1986). As underlined by Maguire, Hardy and 
Lawrence (2004), the concept of the institutional entrepreneur focuses on these struggles 
and the manner in which interested actors influence their institutional contexts (and 
unsettle their organizational field). “A new institution arises when organized actors with 
sufficient resources (institutional entrepreneurs) see in them an opportunity to realize 
interests that they value highly” (DiMaggio, 1988, p14). The emergence of a new institution 
is thus a political process that reflects organization’s power and interests and the 
coordination of actors who are able to convince and enrol (align interests of) other actors 
for the shape of the new institution. However, institutional entrepreneurs not only promote 
the emergence of a new institution. They also transform their environment and challenge 
the existing institutions, in a process that can be seen as similar to the challenge of new 
entrants to incumbents.  
Second, the institutionalization process is a cultural process in which legitimacy plays an 
important role. Garud et al. (2002) argue that institutional entrepreneurs create whole 
systems of meaning that tie disparate sets of organisations together. Assuming the role of 
champion, they energize efforts towards collective actions. Dacin et al (2002) note that the 
creation, transformation and growth of the new institution require legitimacy as an 
essential precondition. Hargadon and Douglas (2001) also emphasise the importance of 
embedding the innovation in designs which are both legitimate and familiar in order to 
better shape the outcome of contests between innovation and established institutions. In a 
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process of institutional change, legitimacy is a both antecedent and outcome.  
Third, the institutionalization process implies the transformation of organizational fields. 
The action of institutional entrepreneurs might not always be a disruptive one. In fact, new 
institutions often emerge through diffusion or imitation processes, especially when they are 
embedded in stable organization fields where well-structured actor-configurations and 
identifiable patterns of interactions already exist (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For example, 
focusing on a small non-governmental organisation in Palestine, Lawrence, Hardy and 
Phillips analyse the process of creation of a new institution as a stage-by-stage 
institutionalisation of inter-organisational collaboration (Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 
2003; Lawrence et al., 2002). They argue that close and continuous collaboration acts as a 
source of change through the generation of ‘proto-organisations’ with new practices, rules 
and technologies that transcend a particular collaborative relationship.4 Sufficiently 
diffused, they may develop into a new institution. In Hardy’s case, the institutionalisation 
process not only generated a new institution but also transformed the institutional context 
through the internalisation of the collaborative relationship. 
Maguire et al. (2004) point out the differences between emergent and mature fields. Mature 
fields represent relatively well structured configurations of actors that are aware of their 
involvement in a common enterprise. The patterns of interactions amongst actors are set: 
interactions are routinised, leading organisations and individuals are identified (Sherer & 
Lee, 2002) and actors’ roles are embodied in their professions and status (Lounsbury, 
2002). In contrast, in emerging fields, the list of actors, as well as the reasons behind their 
potential interest and involvement, is not yet clear. Networks overlap poorly and the 
relations amongst actors have still to be defined. The roles and positions are changing 
within and between organisations as institutions are unsettled and coordination amongst 
organisations (professional associations, lobbying organisations, etc.) are under-organised 
(Lawrence et al., 2002).  
The domain of nanotechnologies, in which the two case studies are situated, has some 
mature sectors, with existing actors and institutions, while at the same time the emerging 
new science and technology create openings and uncertainties. The two main scientific 
                                                 
4 Such processes have been documented for the development and societal embedding of new technologies 
under the heading of ‘strategic niche management’. See Hoogma, R., Kemp, R., Schot, J., & Truffer, B. 
2002. Experimenting for Sustainable Transport. The approach of Strategic Niche Management. London: 
Spon Press., and for analysis of a range of cases about the introduction of electric vehicles, Remco 
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fields which feed nanotechnologies are microelectronics and life sciences. In both these 
fields, institutions and coordination mechanisms have emerged during the last 30 years: 
transformation of intellectual property rights, support for creating start-ups and spin-offs 
from academia, professional organisations etc. The cluster-building actions of the 
institutional entrepreneurs that we are studying entail the transformation of the regional 
institutional field, which requires legitimacy, resources and support. The entrepreneur does 
not build a proto-organisation from scratch: s/he is already part of institutionalised 
organisation. The specificity of his/her action as entrepreneur is that s/he orchestrates a 
highly complex process, in which his/her role in promoting a regional nanotechnology 
cluster may represent a challenge to his/her own organisation. 
However, the entrepreneur’s action cannot be taken as intrapreneurship (that is, an 
entrepreneur within a specific organization). Indeed, he is not creating a subsidiary 
company from his institution. He is rather creating a meta-level which federates different 
organisations, be they academic (National research centres and universities) public 
authority (Regional authorities and city councils) branches of multinational firms or start-
ups. His/her action is an institutional one, with the three characteristics defined by Hardy 
et al: cultural process, socio-political process and transformation of organisational field.  
Most authors studying institutional change focus on changes within a single firm or a 
single population of organisations – examples include publishing houses (Thornton, 2002), 
accounting organisations (Greenwood, Hinings, & Cooper, 1999; Lee & Pennings, 2002), 
business schools (Casile & Davis-Blake, 2002), Sun Microsystems (Garud et al., 2002) and 
law firms (Sherer et al., 2002). In each case, dominant forms are selected and the analysis 
reveal how the adoption of a revised practice is variously affected by organisational 
attributes or population characteristics (Dacin et al., 2002). The focus on clusters broadens 
the usual field level studies. Porter defines clusters as “geographic concentrations of 
interconnected companies and institutions in a particular field” (Porter, 1998, p 78). The 
focal point is no longer a single organisation but rather a meta-level of coordination 
amongst different types of actors: academia and industry, existing institutions like venture 
capital or technology transfer offices or incubators, research and production facilities like 
clean rooms or large and unique instrumentation (e.g. a synchrotron) (Meyer, 2005). The 
cluster is also at the crossroad of different public policy actions, regional of course, but also 
                                                                                                                                                          
Hoogma, Exploiting Technological Niches, University of Twente, 2000. 
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national and European.  
The multilevel creation of clusters is similar to creation of standards as an entrepreneurial 
act (Hwang & Powell, 2005). Actors play at the local level with a permanent reference to 
international categories to gain in legitimacy or credibility. Haas (Haas, 1992) describe 
these actors as being part of epistemic communities (i.e. group of actors sharing the codes 
in which theories are expressed) while Hakanson (Hakanson, 2005) underlines that the 
communities are needed as knowledge in the making is context dependent. Communities 
extend beyond individual organisations, span organisational boundaries to create and 
legitimise common codes and cognitive frames. These communities are often 
geographically concentrated in clusters, which encourages the circulation of sticky, 
informal and uncodified knowledge, although, as Knorr-Cetina points out, they can also be 
geographically more extended.(Knorr Cetina, 1999). One of the additional dimensions of 
standard settings is the deinstitutionalisation process that it involves, as organisations loose 
autonomy over the decision process and control of their technical choices. 
However, the case of standard creation is somehow different from the creation of clusters: 
making standards is a process of “remaking of institutions” (Hwang et al., 2005) while in 
the actions of cluster-institutionalising entrepreneurs aim to set up a new meta-level 
institution, which can be in different organisational forms (incentive schemes, public 
policies, mergers amongst organisations, or building sharing). In that sense, such actions 
borrow from the creation of a new institution, in the model of Nouvelle Cuisine (Roa, 
Monin, & Durand, 2003) which arose as a critique of the “old school”, making a clear 
break with it to ‘recreate’ the field of gastronomy. Cluster-institutionalising entrepreneurs 
not only bring together, as it were, the chefs of independent restaurants; they also put 
together actors from different spheres (academia, industry, venture capital, policy makers) 
to foster geographic concentration and the convergence of anticipations and investments, 
and to concentrate public and private investment in specific locations to reduce uncertainty. 
In such a framework, some locations will be able to attract additional actors and investors 
while others will not.  
3. TWO CASE STUDIES 
We use development of the Minatec and Twente clusters as our cases studies to examine 
how institutional entrepreneurs align public and private anticipations and to stimulate 
investment in leading regional clusters. The paper explores how such entrepreneurs 
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mobilise the support of their organisation to create the cluster and its consequences for 
existing organisations. Data collection is based on historical records, archives and 
interviews with the main actors, including, in both cases, in-depth discussions with the 
individual who appears to be the “entrepreneur”.  
3.1. Minatec (Grenoble) 
To build the history and follow the emergence of the Minatec cluster, in addition to 
interviews and archives, we track the enrolment process through the 102 presentations 
(comprising more than 700 slides) given by Jean Therme, the institutional entrepreneur 
from CEA/LETI5 (Grenoble) to audiences of different actors. His diary has also been 
scanned to identify which actors were met when, the meeting sequence and how negotiation 
results were integrated into slides. We used co-word analysis (Alceste software®) to 
identified the thematic in each presentation and their relative importance.  
Czarniawska and Joerges’ (1996) translation model framework, which conceptualizes 
translated elements as linguistic artefacts, is used to present our cases. They argue that 
ideas “are communicated images, intersubjective creations, and therefore the ‘property’ of 
a community rather than of a single person” (1996: 33). Ideas, therefore, need to be 
translated to travel across institutional contexts, and they describe the translation process 
as one of selecting ideas, objectifying them, and finally materializing them into new forms. 
New forms are quasi-objects - as it were a book, picture, or design - that can travel on to 
other social contexts. Selection refers to problem resolution: “Organizational actors, like a 
collective ant-eater, catch many, spit out most, and savour some [ideas], presumably on the 
grounds of relevance to some organizational problem” (1996: 25). Objectification consists 
in labelling ideas so that they may be understood at a collective level: “The simplest way of 
objectifying ideas is turning them into linguistic artefacts by a repetitive use in an 
unchanged form” (1996: 32). In the last step, materialization, ideas are transformed into 
practice: “This magic moment when words become deeds is the one that truly deserves to be 
called materialization, whether performed mostly by human actors or mostly by material 
artefacts” (1996: 41). We apply this translation model, and its three steps of selecting, 
                                                 
5 CEA (Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique) is the French equivalent of Department of Energy in the US. 
During the 90’s, it diversified towards high technologies, especially microelectronics. CEA/LETI (or 
LETI) is one of the main divisions of the parent body CEA, dedicated to microelectronics.  
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objectifying, and materializing ideas, to analyze the contextualization that individual actors 
accomplish during institutional building process. 
The opportunity for the Minatec cluster to emerge resulted partly from an initial ‘outside 
event’ which could be called “luck” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1994): the Grenole city council 
was looking out for realistic projects to use city land adjacent to the CEA site, thus offering 
the opportunity for expansion. Jean Therme, then in charge of the strategy at LETI, 
formed a vision of what the future of micro-electronics in Grenoble could be.  
The journey of the Minatec idea can be described as follows: 
(1) Articulation of goal, formation and selection of ideas 
While the Grenoble region has a long history of excellence in science, technology and 
knowledge-based industry, for our purposes the advent of Minatec is a natural focus. As in 
all innovation cases, there are heroes, mythology and “development”. Claude Gaubert, the 
vice-head of INPG (Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble, the largest engineering 
department in University in France) explains it the following way: “looking at the projects 
on a map, there was our project on one side of CEA and the other project on the other side. 
They were next to each other. As head of CEA/LETI, Jean Therme saw that the two 
projects were deeply complementary and the cluster of innovation in micro and 
nanotechnologies was born!” 
The concept of MINATEC has been maturing for about five years and it has been, and still 
is, promoted by CEA and mainly by Jean Therme, who was its spokesman since the very 
beginning. Appointed deputy head of LETI in October 1997, Therme knew that he would be 
taking over as CEA/LETI’s leader within a few years. To gain a better insight into the full 
spectrum of LETI’s technological fields, he formed (July 1998) an internal working group 
in charge of elaborating a strategy for LETI in 2000 called “LETI 2000-WG”. This became 
an arena for him to test the possibility of LETI’s scientists and engineers working in a more 
integrated manner with scientists working on more fundamental research. This mission 
gave him a lot of autonomy, as he was independent of the normal vertical hierarchy, and 
allowed him to explore possible perspectives of evolution within his organization and to 
benchmark the dynamics of the industry and competitors’ activities. 
Two additional elements of Therme’s professional trajectory stimulated convergence of 
anticipations and the agglomeration effect. He had spent his entire career in different 
institutions at Grenoble (INPG - University, ST Microelectronics - Firm, and CEA) and he 
retained a high degree of credibility amongst previous colleagues who were by now in 
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strategic decision making positions. This personal legitimacy amongst his colleagues 
supported the credibility for the vision that he built during the MINATEC enrolment 
process. 
During this period, ideas and projects were in the air. Academic deans, heads of national 
labs, as well as local policy makers and industrialists were confronting their visions and 
their anticipations in different meetings, at different levels, whether scientific, 
technological or political.  
(2) Mobilization of resources, of legitimating/credibility. 
In August 1999, Jean Therme was appointed head of CEA/LETI and joined the internal 
project team which was in charge of generating ideas for using the land around CEA.6 It 
started in 1997 as a response to the city’s willingness to use the vast unoccupied piece of 
land in downtown Grenoble. Jean Therme realised this represented an excellent 
opportunity for expansion. Exploiting his high credibility within the organisation following 
LETI 2000-WG he began to mobilize and negotiate resources with the other partners. He 
spent more than a year listening to partners and drawing insights from them, whether 
appreciating INPG’s needs as a member of its board, or meeting the Mayor of Grenoble 
and other public authority representatives on the golf course or the ski slopes or at the 
Sunday market. 
Therme’s strategy was threefold: 
Promotion of the concept as an ‘institution-to-be’ to convince people beyond CEA and 
INPG; 
Giving rhetorical and administrative reality to MINATEC through presentations for the 
city council and National and European public authorities; 
Starting to plan the site before defining what was to be put inside its buildings. 
 
During the first year (1999-2000) his human and financial resources were mostly internal 
to CEA/LETI and INPG. At the time, resources were being devoted to preparing projects 
for the EC 6
th framework programme. The main goal was to promote Grenoble as a leader 
                                                 
6 Originally, the area was designed to answer some precise needs: (1) CEA’s start-ups needing to stay 
close to their initial laboratory, (2) SMEs or start-ups wanting to perpetuate collaborations with Leti (3) 
SMEs or start-ups needed production facilities in clean rooms. Three technological fields are concerned 
with the project: materials, biotechnologies, microtechnologies.  
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or as a key partner within different projects, especially the most prestigious programmes i.e. 
Integrated projects and Networks of Excellence.7 CEA and INPG shared the scientific 
leadership of these European projects.  
(3) Realization/materialization, including concrete negotiations and implementations. 
The two stages “Mobilization of resources” and “realization/materialization” have been 
strongly interrelated. Meeting all the actors potentially involved in Minatec informally, 
Jean Therme was able to quickly integrate their feedbacks in his presentation and thus to 
enrol them. Graph 1 displays the evolution of the J. Therme’s strategy from September 
1999 to January 2002. There were 102 presentations over a 28 months period. 
 
Please insert Graph 1 around here 
 
From the 102 presentations, we were able to isolate 760 different slides. Co-word analysis 
(Alceste®) on the slides titles and bodies has been used to visualise the thematic of each 
slide and their evolution. Alceste clusters the words which co-appear and allows 
classification of slides into classes. It has been possible to identify five clusters of words, 
labelled as follows: 
Class 1: Minatec’s position compared to other national or European clusters; 
Class 2: Definition of the concept of the Minatec ‘institution-to-be’, without it being 
explicitly named; 
Class 3: Scope of Scientific and Technological actors which could be involved in Minatec; 
Class 4: Technical and financial concerns about the cluster (inc. Business plan.); 
Class 5: Position of Minatec vis-à-vis the CEA institution. 
 
Please insert graph 2 around here 
 
The series of graph 2 displays the evolution of each theme. Even within a generic set of 
slides, Therme adapts the presentational themes that can be seen changing according to the 
                                                 
 
7 Integrated project and Network of Excellence are two European tools to foster Excellence in Europe. 
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audience and as the project matures. The following "abnormal" points on each graph can 
be detailed: 
1. The positioning of Grenoble against other districts is not a major issue, and represents 
less than 15 % of the slides. One possible explanation is that presentations are made to 
audience who do not need to be convinced of the challenge that faced Grenoble: for 
example, Motorola who had installed a research centre in Grenoble in 1999, INPG, LETI’s 
sparring partner, the French academy of sciences, internal CEA meetings or those 
presentations whose object is very specific (such as 25 business plan presentations). By 
comparison presentations to companies outside the field, or to public authorities, are more 
likely to deal with the project’s positioning in comparison to others. 
2. Only six presentations focused on the definition of the concept of Minatec. These 
presentations targeted audiences who need to be convinced that action had to be taken. 
They were people who could directly support the entrepreneur in achieving the project, by 
providing funding or political and/or institutional support. They included early 
presentations to INPG, as co-supporter of the project, presentations at CEA Grenoble 
general meetings, to regional public authorities and policy makers, to head of the CEA in 
Paris (whose agreement was mandatory if the project was to move on to any concrete 
reality), followed by CEA Grenoble management as soon as agreement had been reached 
with CEA Paris. One striking point is that the name “Minatec” appeared late in the 
presentation sequence, in December 2000: before that, neither the project nor its 
boundaries were given much definition.  
3. Usually a fifth to a third of the slides of each presentation dealt with scientific and 
technological aspects. This proportion was higher for presentations to scientists (at 
universities, or to CEA’s own scientists): perhaps more interestingly, it seems that, for other 
audiences, the actual content of Minatec was clearly not the main issue. 
4. Financial and administrative aspects were also discussed only with selected audiences 
who were highly involved in the project. The first point signals the presentation to CEA's 
head in Paris, which was an important hurdle to overcome before the mobilisation process 
could begin. During the second half of the period, slides dealing with financial aspects 
represent a majority of the themes (presentation to city council and regional authorities and 
to INPG). The second point is the peak at presentation 25 (the first presentation to outline 
                                                                                                                                                          
They are the most well funded programmes to support research.  
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the various dimensions of the project’s realisation, especially funding). 
5. Following the CEA Paris presentation, Therme had to convince the management and the 
employees at CEA Grenoble of the benefits of the emergence of Minatec: many saw the 
development as implying a threat to CEA/LETI and thus to their own jobs.  
The slide presentations gave life and reality to the project, which was deliberately left 
indistinct at the very beginning, and were designed to enable each partner to position 
himself regarding the project and its agenda as the Minatec concept evolved. The 
appearance of the name Minatec was also a highly symbolic event, being unveiled at a 
meeting with CEA hierarchy, bringing further reality to the vision.  
The second element which gave some material form to Minatec was the launch of the 
website, presenting not only the project, its partners and funding, but also pictures of what 
it could be in the future, including buildings, clean rooms, etc. The Minatec website offered 
a view of the future to mobilize the present, promoting Minatec as a concept, as a resource 
centre, as a training platform and as a science park for start-ups. It presented the potential 
of Minatec, as well as five key ingredients essential to success: 
An integrated approach to innovation, from the exploration of technological breakthroughs 
to immediate industrial applications. This is essential to negotiate the transition from 
advanced microelectronics to nanotechnology successfully, for the evolution of 
heterogeneous micro components and to design tomorrow's smart devices and mobile 
terminals; 
A high concentration of skills and resources, more than 3,500 engineers, researchers and 
academics would be working at Minatec; 
International alliances and partnerships, which confirm Minatec’s status as a centre of 
excellence; 
An ambitious policy of ongoing investment: A total of €150m would be invested in Minatec 
between 2002 and 2005 to fund the new infrastructure, in addition to the €250m invested by 
CEA-LETI and INP Grenoble. Over the previous 10 years, the microelectronics industry 
was shown to have invested €4bn in the Grenoble-Isère area; 
A talent pool dedicated to science and advanced technology: Minatec was associated with 
an estimated 17,000 jobs in scientific and academic research, 220 laboratories and five 
international research centres, 53,000 students and 10 engineering schools together with a 
powerful local microelectronics industry, comprising 13,350 workers (including 3,000 in 
research), 30 international corporations, and 20 high-potential start-ups launched in the 
last five years; 
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Intermediary conclusion 
The graphs of the relative presence of the themes within the slide presentations depict the 
journey of ideas, and how Therme convinced his partners to climb aboard, even if the 
vessel did not yet exist. He first emphasised the international challenge to stimulate 
reactions and commitments. Showing how other clusters were emerging elsewhere was a 
way to push his potential partners to react, create a sense of urgency. “Look what they are 
doing, how they organise themselves to innovate. What will happen if we don’t do 
anything”? Therme shared his view that “we must do something to stay in the 
competition”. At the same time, he presented the main concepts of Minatec, which evolved 
from an indistinct picture to a more precise definition, with name, image and architectural 
plans.  
As anticipations converged to make action a necessity, scientific and technological contents 
were discussed, as well as the impacts of Minatec on CEA/LETI. Finally, when 
anticipations were stabilised, contents defined and legitimacy enhanced by EC projects, 
Therme opened the discussion on financial aspects. He managed progressive lock-in, from 
creating a sense of urgency to do something, to defining the scientific and technological 
contents, aligning the relevant actors at each stage. Jean Therme and CEA/LETI appears 
to be a central actor, with clear leadership, profiting from available assets and managing 
them strategically. A building construction process is the central feature, which is 
legitimated by the important role of infrastructure and facilities. One striking point in this 
case is the relative absence of the national policy makers. Their mobilisation was only 
indirect, through negotiations with public authorities, CEA – Paris and through national 
programmes.8  
3.2 Twente and the NanoNed consortium 
The story starts in the region of Twente, in the east of the Netherlands, with an 
entrepreneurial university, active regional actors, and a world-level nanoscience and 
technology institute MESA+, with twenty start-ups (not all nanotechs in the strict sense) 
around it. The Director of MESA+, David Reinhoudt, and a small band of fellow 
                                                 
8 In 2005 the French government launched a programme to support centres of excellence. Minatec has 
been identified as one of five world class centre of excellence, which between them have been allocated 
80% of the programme budget. 
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institutional entrepreneurs, took the lead in setting up NanoNed, a national consortium in 
nanosciences and technology, which acquired major funding through a government 
program for knowledge infrastructure. But this is not a linear story, there are twists and 
turns, and other actors play a decisive role in defining and shaping the eventual outcome. 
(1) Articulation of goal, formation and selection of ideas 
MESA+ evolved from an earlier conglomerate of groups and institutes in the University of 
Twente working in the general area of sensors, actuators and micro-systems. By 1999, 
further mergers with electronics, optics, and materials research groups led to the 
establishment of MESA+, with special investments in extensive clean room facilities and 
linked to a TechPark (itself building on predecessors from the early 1990s). MESA+ has 
high international visibility and is embedded in networks of excellence. 
This gradual convergence and the eventual uptake of the label ‘nanotechnology’ had much 
to do with the availability of overlapping technology platforms and the possibility of their 
expansion – which required institutional entrepreneurship. Instead of attempting to expand 
and consolidate MESA+, which might have been problematic because of the small size of 
the university and the region, and the limited infrastructure (at the time, no major 
companies with an interest in nanotechnology were involved), the ‘band of four’ - David 
Reinhoudt and his fellow entrepreneurs, the business director of MESA+ and two regional 
actors – decided to pursue two tracks. One focused on start-ups and support for creating 
value and mobilising resources from relevant actors, including the national-level Ministry 
of Economic Affairs. The other focused on the possibility of developing a national-level 
priority for nano-science & technology. To be credible in pursuing this second track 
involved joining forces with the two other big centres in the Netherlands, BIOMADE 
(University of Groningen) and DIMES (Technical University of Delft).9. This action relates 
to a Royal Netherlands Academy of Science’s policy of support for nano-science & 
technology, which had itself been prepared by the directors of the three centres. This dual-
track approach highlights two interesting features: how regional cluster-building might 
require alliances with centres elsewhere, and how a multi-level situation allows positive 
feedback, i.e. preparing the ground at the national level, for subsequent institutional 
                                                 
 
9 The other two centres are comparable to MESA+ in terms of size, excellence, and links with small and 
large firms. Both had profited from funding under an earlier round of ICES/KIS, the government 
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entrepreneurship. 
(2) Mobilization of resources, of legitimating/credibility. 
In 2000, the three nanotech centres developed a “Masterplan Nanotechnology”, following 
advice from the government Ministry of Economic Affairs, which also suggested funding 
possibilities, in particular through Dreamstart, a newly established scheme to support small 
innovative enterprises. Dreamstart embraced this opportunity to focus on nanotechnology 
to carve out a niche for itself, in a world where ICT and biotech enterprises already had 
their dedicated support schemes. However, despite early Ministerial support, Dreamstart’s 
lack of linkages with the world of innovation and valorisation led to disappointing progress, 
and the scheme was reduced to a mediating program with a limited budget. The frustrated 
‘band of four’ and the three-centre alliance had to look elsewhere for funding 
opportunities.  
At the same time (2000) the Ministry of Economic Affairs was considering which themes 
should be highlighted in preparing for the third round of the ICES/KIS funding program 
for supporting knowledge infrastructure.10 At first, nanotechnology was included under 
ICT, but advisers suggested it should be a separate theme (perhaps combined with micro-
systems). The alliance of the three centres would be an obvious candidate to bid for this 
theme, even though it was more application-oriented than nanoscience and technology 
could be at the time. The Ministry – via an active senior official who was something of a 
bureaucratic entrepreneur – made it clear informally to the alliance that it was prepared to 
exert political pressure to get a nanotechnology proposal accepted, from them or from 
others. The cluster-building aspirations of the Twente ‘band of four’ now became 
secondary to the attempt to access ICES-KIS funding. This shift was reinforced when other 
actors (TNO, the big applied-research organisation in the Netherlands, and the Technical 
University of Eindhoven) claimed they should have access to ICES-KIS nanotechnology 
funding as well, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs accepted these claims and asked two 
consultants to check the quality and infrastructural capabilities of the various competitors. 
Their work (May-July 2001) was the starting point in the assembly of a consortium which 
                                                                                                                                                          
program to support knowledge infrastructure. 
10 The ICES/KIS funding program is part of a general infrastructural support program designed to ensure 
that government income from sales of natural gas is used for in-depth investment rather than 
compensating short-term budgetary problems. 
   18
eventually had eight partners, rather than just three centres. In other words, the building of 
a Twente cluster was temporarily superseded by the attempt to secure ICES-KIS funding. 
The net effect was of stronger interactions at the national level, creating, in effect, a 
regional cluster (with an internal division of labour amongst the actors) at the national 
level (the Netherlands is a small country!). 
The Expression of Interest for the ICES-KIS call, written and submitted in August 2001, 
still referred closely to the earlier plans and reports which were added as appendices. The 
Ministry, through its entrepreneurial senior official, continued its support by making 
special funding (Nano-Impuls, part of an Innovation Impulse funding programme) 
available to maintain momentum while the full proposal was written up for the March 2003 
deadline. Just as for the Nano-Impuls application, the full proposal involved programs 
(“flagships”) with research projects, as well as separate funding for knowledge 
infrastructure (“NanoLab”) in the form of facilities in the three main centres.11  
The historical data for 1999-2003 details the shifts that occurred to address resource 
mobilisation opportunities, as well as the ‘boundary’ work (defining and guarding the 
scope of nanotechnology) and the frequent political ‘repair’ work needed to keep the 
various actors aligned. In a multi-level situation, an institutional entrepreneur depends on 
actors at other levels: in this case, the entrepreneurship was shared with Ministry officials, 
who went out of their way to help realize a Dutch nanotechnology initiative. 
Another effect was the need to achieve some semblance of coordination between partners 
who otherwise might see themselves in outright competition. Cluster participants were 
positioned according to their specializations with cross-cutting “flagships” at the 
consortium national level.  
(3) realization/materialization, including the concrete negotiations and implementations. 
By 2003, NanoNed played a coordination role as its Board was able to be selective in its 
decisions. Despite this, coordination would not be stable, as participants would grasp 
opportunities as they see them, while the NanoNed consortium has only restricted 
influence, as it finances only part of the ongoing work. 
                                                 
11 At a very late stage, Philips Company moved from an observer’s position (as a Board member, and -with 
other companies - of the user committee) to that of a full participant of the consortium. Even after the 
proposal’s positive assessment, this created further delays at Ministry and EC levels while checks were 
made as to whether the funding might lead to unfair competition. 
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Within the NanoNed consortium, an important part of the funding is allocated to 
investment in the Dutch nanotechnology experimental infrastructure. Funding worth 
€8.5M had already been awarded from the NanoImpuls programme and €45M was be 
made available via NanoNed. The NanoNed consortium agreement allocated funding 
between three locations in the Netherlands where large nanotechnological facilities are 
already in place: Delft (DIMES and TNO), Groningen (BioMaDe), and Twente (MESA+). 
Full co-ordination of this arrangement, enabling use by all consortium participants, was 
scheduled from 2005 onwards.12
The strong involvement of the Ministry of Economic affairs, through the ICES/KIS 
funding led to a shift from a regional cluster to a national consortium of interrelated 
specialised clusters. While the institutional entrepreneurs originally saw the consortium as 
perhaps the only means whereby they could develop their own operations, the consortium 
now has a life of its own, and the distributed coordination which emerged may turn out to 
have advantages. Tensions remain, however, and not just between the university groups. 
Philips Company, formally part of the NanoNed consortium, continues to pursue its own 
interests, such as the growth of the research campus it has created on its premises and its 
avowed goal to push for a micro- and nanotech triangle between Eindhoven (where major 
research labs are located), Louvain in Belgium (with IMEC) and Aachen in Germany.13 
However, Philips does recognize Twente as a centre of excellence for nanotechnology.  
Clearly, both joint and competing institutional-entrepreneurial activities will continue while 
the NanoNed consortium materializes and becomes a going concern. 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The stories of Minatec and Mesa+/NanoNed reveal the emergence of two clusters built at 
the convergence of existing technological, economic and institutional paths. Clusters do not 
appear from scratch - they result from long term investment in sciences, technologies, firms 
and institutions in areas interrelated to nanotechnologies. Several clusters have emerged in 
                                                 
12 The programme has a national orientation, and investment decisions link to national objectives. The 
agreement confirms that the parties together with the boards of NanoNed and NanoImpuls compare 
proposed investments with the objective of creating this NanoLab NL: local interests are secondary. 
13 “Initiatives by governments, industries and knowledge institutions are rapidly transforming the region 
between Aachen, Leuven and Eindhoven from an industry-based area to a technology- and knowledge-
based economy with potential to rival some of the world’s most prestigious regions of excellence.” Philips 
Research Password, 19 (April 2004). 
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the Netherlands and France (around Toulouse, around Paris, and Strasbourg). In the two 
countries, the situations were different: the Netherlands emphasising the coordination 
through the specialisation of each cluster, while in France regions have been competing. 
Minatec and Mesa+ did not emerge as leading clusters by chance or from a natural process 
of agglomeration. They resulted from specific cluster-building actions by institutional 
entrepreneurs who combine different projects into one converging cluster. In both cases, 
the institutional entrepreneur plays an architectural role to combine blocks of interests 
from different actors to shape a meta level which coordinates existing organisations. To 
mobilise actors, they focus on promises, far in advance of the current situation, building on 
an initially indistinct project outline to create progressive lock-in, as growing numbers of 
actors become increasingly involved. Inevitably, once cluster materialisation begins, there 
will be counter-pressures: institutions federated under the cluster umbrella will start to re-
assert their specific interests (Grenoble) and/or pursue other alliances and resource 
mobilisation strategies (NanoNed).  
1. Architectural role of Cluster-institutionalising entrepreneur 
Table 1 compares the bottom-up building of the clusters in Minatec and Mesa+.  
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Table 1: Comparison of the process of Minatec and Mesa+ emergences 
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In both cases, institutional entrepreneurs identified spaces where the project could be 
developed. At Grenoble, it is a physical location, in land around the existing CEA site. In 
the case of Mesa+, it was the new area of nanotechnology which required coordination, 
and the result was a ‘virtual cluster’, where nation-wide co-ordination replaced the 
‘classic’ model of a regional cluster based on physical proximity. Cluster-institutionalising 
entrepreneurs try to fill spaces which cannot be filled by one single institution. In Grenoble, 
an extension of one organisation i.e. CEA/LETI would have been seen as an illegitimate 
hegemony of CEA against academia. In the Mesa+ case, the University and the region of 
Twente were too small to be able to develop an ambitious nanotechnology programme, but 
national public authorities stimulated the creation of a network to coordinate research and 
development on nanotechnologies. In each case, the process of selection of ideas is a 
process of ‘catching an opportunity’, and the idea which finally emerges is the one which is 
broad enough to create convergence amongst different existing projects and is not 
incompatible with the main stakeholders’ goals.  
Cluster-institutionalising entrepreneurs are those able to identify such an opportunity, and 
to build their project on it (Cohen et al., 1994). They mobilize resources from their own 
institution during the preparation phase and to institutionalise it. Both Reinhoudt and 
Therme occupy leading positions in their organisation, and thus enjoy legitimacy within 
their own institution to drive their visions. However, they also depend on others. 
CEA/LETI’s involvement in the project and their support had to be validated by the head of 
CEA, and MESA+ could only continue only when the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
facilitated new funding pathways. In addition to their leading institutional positions, their 
scientific legitimacy and their professional trajectory, allowed them to gather a team of 
people in leading positions around them. With these contacts, they are able to broadcast 
their vision around them to leaders of different institutions and mobilise public authorities 
when they need to, locally in France, nationally in the Netherlands.  
These institutional entrepreneurs were able to build on the scientific and technological 
excellence assessed through the prestigious Network of Excellence and Integrated Project 
programmes at the European level14. The role of the institutional entrepreneur here is not 
to build such frameworks himself, but to aggregate existing and on-going projects and 
                                                 
14 These new instruments in the EC 6
th framework programme are designed to identify and support 
clustering around European centres of excellence. 
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actions which have been created by different regional or sector leaders, making sense of 
disconnected projects and activities to underline their convergence and to nurture the 
activities of the cluster-to-be. Minatec has a geographic basis, within the natural 
boundaries of Grenoble, while NanoNed is a national network, but still with good 
geographical proximity of the participants. For Mesa+, the delineation of those who are 
part of NanoNed and those who are outside was part of the game in terms of mobilising 
additional resources, especially access to national support structures.  
Cluster-institutionalising entrepreneurs develop an incrementalist strategy to be able to surf 
on any opportunities to promote their specific project (Balogun & Johnson, 2005). 
Legitimacy from European projects boosts their visibility, and they can take advantage of 
their position in their own organisation to mobilise resources. During the two first stages, 
the main role of institutional entrepreneurs is to combine projects and interests to give 
shape and definition to the project. At the start of the process, boundaries become defined 
step by step, according to who decides to participate and support the project. Thus the 
process of selection of ideas is also a process of selection of allies and enemies. The 
institutional entrepreneurs simultaneously shape definition of what is meant by 
nanotechnology and the boundaries of the new institution. They shape and reshape rules 
and coordination, building an institutional architecture (especially institutional frontiers) 
according to the blocks of interests they need to include.  
Context appears to precede content. In Grenoble, Therme acted to give reality to his cluster 
before its actual existence. First came the name and the website, then virtual images and 
film of the buildings. Subsequently Minatec’s visibility included buildings of thousands of 
square meters, ensuring the vision had some concrete existence before funding, agreements 
and management principles were finalized. In the NanoNed history, arrangements such as 
division of labour were drafted in order to mobilize funding but, to be credible to sponsors, 
started to take effect before actual funding and subsequent work began in 2005. 
Stirring up the mayonnaise 
The cluster-institutionalising entrepreneurs use the threat of competition to create a sense 
of urgency, which they then use to motivate different blocks of interests (academic ones, 
public policy ones, economic ones) to combine under a common umbrella - the cluster. 
They are somewhat in between a cook and an architect. The main engine of institutional 
entrepreneurs is the long term vision that they develop of what the cluster could be if they 
succeed in taking the various actors along with them. They thus redefine tactics and 
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rephrase the formulation of existing activities to nurture the cluster and increasingly 
validate its constitution through progressively enrolling and locking partners in. As in 
preparing a mayonnaise, they create linkages and emulsion between separated and 
disconnected components. They have to manage the critical moments: when to stir it up 
and when to negotiate, to create lock-in and irreversibilities. The cluster becomes 
institutionalised as buildings, rules (cooperation principles, access to equipments, and 
mobilisation of human resources), coordination (sharing equipment, etc.), funding and 
organisation (offices, technology transfer mechanisms, etc.) sign up to the vision. Lock-in 
appears at different stages of the emergence of the clusters: as the idea takes shape, 
entrepreneurs negotiate with actors to integrate blocks of interests, reshaping rules, 
coordination mechanisms and cluster frontiers in the process. Such creation requires that 
the entrepreneur create institutional linkages, bridging across structural holes to connect 
separated elements.  
2. King of the backyard versus Duke of a continent 
Cluster building entrepreneurs tend to extent their span of control (to become a Duke of a 
continent) even if it leads to a loss of influence of their organisation (Kingdom). They 
develop a twofold strategy: delaying consideration of effects on parent organisation until 
it’s too late to withdraw and trade off of ‘buying’ acceptance of the cluster in the parent 
organisation by giving it an important role, and its managers significant positions, in the 
cluster. 
As institutional entrepreneurs focus far forward, tensions with their institution remain 
weak as there is no immediate threat. All interest is mobilised around the promised vision, 
and discussions on the potential effects on the institutions are postponed. The strategy to 
overcome potential resistance was an incrementalist strategy built around promises. 
Agreements on promises delay the discussion of the potential consequences for the 
institution. Only few actors have a clear enough vision of what the future could be to 
anticipate potential problems within organisations – but they are likely to be those who are 
promoting the cluster (Hailey & Balogun, 2002). However, as the project becomes more 
precise and more real, it also becomes more challenging for the organisation, which must 
then enter into a sharp negotiation with the institutional entrepreneur who appears to be a 
traitor, playing for the interests of the cluster rather than defending those of his own 
employer-institution.  
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During the institutionalisation process, there is a bargaining between a partial dissolution 
of the organisation’s identity and influence to the benefit of the cluster and in return a 
leading position for managers of the organisation (Univ of Twente and CEA) in the cluster. 
For CEA or University of Twente, deinstitutionalisation means de-alignment of actors 
within the organisation to be able to strengthen the alignment of actors in the cluster. 
However, the relations between the institutional entrepreneur and his institution are 
facilitated as they are based on mutual trust. J. Therme and D. Reinhoudt have experienced 
different positions in the organisations involved in the cluster at different stages of their 
careers, and thus have internal credibility and networks to rely on. In addition to their 
individual mobility within their regional organisation, the Cluster-institutionalising 
entrepreneurs benefit from networks of the managers who were their colleagues. David 
Reinhoudt has been the leader of a small band of fellow institutional entrepreneurs while 
Jean Therme has a group of 5-6 managers with whom he has been working for more than 
5 years at least. During the emerging phase of Minatec, all of these managers were in 
charge of one of the project’s dimensions, according to their professional or political 
competencies (one of Therme’s colleagues was a political decision maker in Grenoble). 
3. Overall conclusions 
The paper analyses institutions in the making. The two cases studies describe the 
emergence of two clusters, from the idea or the vision of a band of leading people to its 
transformation into buildings, funding, structured networks and scientific projects, R&D 
facilities and an attractive location for R&D departments. Institutional entrepreneurs build 
on opportunities when new possibilities create openings. Both entrepreneurs mobilised 
resources from their institutions to enrol actors around their vision, and to establish their 
legitimacy for leading the project. Their long-term vision highlights the gap between the 
existing situation and the potential future, emphasizes the need to act so as to remain in a 
competitive worldwide position, and allows them to bypass immediate resistances. Their 
strategy to bring the promise of nanotechnology to reality entails building their new 
institution from the ‘outside’ in order to be able to create a working ‘inside’, and delaying 
the confrontation with existing institutions until the third phase. They build on the strength 
of their own existing institution in the first phase, but eventually it will have to change for 
the new institution to be realized. The de-institutionalisation process is never addressed 
directly until after it becomes a fait accompli. In both cases, Minatec and Mesa+ are 
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presented as a chance to make the organisation bigger, more visible, and to leverage 
resources. Each organisation involved in Minatec or Mesa+ is presented as the leader of 
one dimension, be it scientific, economic or technological.  
The nature of the new institution is different in the two cases: a new lab is built in Grenoble 
while in the Netherlands a new level of coordination and funding allocation is created. The 
process of institutionalisation i.e. articulation from the beginning (Grenoble) vs. emerging 
articulation (Twente) – does differ, but less strikingly so than we thought originally. Jean 
Therme is not the lone hero conquering all, and David Reinhoudt does have his continuing 
goals that he tries to realize. The shape of the coordination achieved will be different 
because of the geographical openness of Twente and the naturally enclosed region of 
Grenoble. Although such local and regional elements can sometimes have significant 
effects, both Twente(+) and Grenoble are active and visible nationally and internationally, 
since strategic science and matters of ongoing nanoscience and technology have became 
globally important (Bathelt, Malmberg, & Maskell, 2004; Rip, 2002). 
The paper illustrates the multilevel action of institutional entrepreneurs who build on their 
own legitimacy to access resources at the local and group levels, make sense of loosely 
coupled actions to illustrate the reality of the potential institution, and thus mobilise 
international resources and legitimacy to finally secure national funding.  
As they create institutions which structure networks (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 
2004), institutional entrepreneurs are part of path creation dynamics. As new institutions 
emerge, their founding entrepreneurs lose control of their trajectories, and go from leading 
evolution to being led by the emerging momentum. Ironically, this phenomenon is already 
visible: to succeed in the Netherlands institutional entrepreneurs had to mobilise resources 
and allies which have then shifted the thrust of the original intentions,15 while in the new 
buildings at Grenoble scientists have tended to re-erect borders between Minatec’s 
constituent organisations. 
                                                 
15 Similar dynamics in political mobilisation, cf. Schattschneider, and the specific examples in Petersen & 
Markle, Expansion of Conflict in Cancer Controversies, where the expansion, necessary to create political 
support, allowed other actors and other considerations in which undermined the thrust which the 
(political) entrepreneur started out with. James C. Petersen and Gerald E. Markle, Expansion of Conflict 
in Cancer Controversies, in Louis Kriesberg (ed.), Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, 
Vol, 4, JAI Press, Fall 1981, pp. 151-169. 
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Intense meeting period 
in Therme’s agenda. 
From June 01 on, 
there are 2 to 3 
meetings per week 
directly in relation to 
Minatec (it is also the 
time when a Minatec 
team appears. 
Convention version. The 
sept/oct activity is linked to 
the presentation of the 
project to A Costes from the 
French ministry of 
































































































































































































































































































































































Class 1: MINATEC’s position compared to other national or European clusters; 
Class 2: Definition of the concept of the Minatec ‘institution-to-be’, without being explicitly 
named; 
Class 3: Scope of Scientific and Technological actors which could be involved in Minatec; 
Class 4: Technical and financial concerns about the cluster (inc. Business plan.); 
Class 5: Position of Minatec vis-à-vis the CEA institution. 
 
 
 